? Question 1 1 out of 1 points Use the following case from questions 32-35 Two street racers are playing a simultaneous game of chicken. They have to race towards each other and whoever swerves fir ...

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? Question 1
1 out of 1 points
Use the following case from questions 32-35
Two street racers are playing a simultaneous game of chicken. They have to race towards each other
and whoever swerves first is chicken and faces shame, a loss of 8, while the winner enjoys a gain of 3.
If neither stop, they would crash into each other, a loss of 10. If both of them swerve at the same time,
they are both chicken and face a loss of 5 each
What would the B’s best response be if player A does not stop?
Selected
Answer: b.
Player B stops, Player A does not
Answers: a.
Player A stops, Player B does not
b.
Player B stops, Player A does not
c.
Neither players stop
d.
Both players stop
? Question 2
1 out of 1 points
Which one of the following is a way to get out of a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Nash Equilibrium?
Selected
Answer: c.
Be easily provoked
Answers: a.
Do not be provoked
b.
Do not be easily provoked
c.
Be easily provoked
d.
All of the above
? Question 3
1 out of 1 points
Use the following to answer questions 81-84
Consider the following information for a simultaneous move game: Two discount stores (megastore
and superstore) are interested in expanding their market share through advertising. The table below
depicts the strategic outcomes (profits) of both stores with and without advertising.
Superstore
Advertise Don’t Advertise
Megastor
e Advertise $95 , $80 $305 , $55
Don’t Advertise $65 , $285 $165 , $115

The Nash equilibrium for the game is
Selected
Answer: b.
For both stores to advertise
Answers: a.
For megastore not to advertise and for superstore to advertise
b.
For both stores to advertise
c.
For megastore to advertise and for superstore not to advertise
d.
For both stores to not advertise
? Question 4
1 out of 1 points
Use the following case from questions 11-17
Two siblings, Sarah and Tom are playing a simultaneous hit and tell game. Sarah can hit Tom or not
and Tom can tattle on Sarah or not. Relative to no hitting and no tattling, if Sarah hits Tom, and he
tattles they both experience a loss of 10. Not telling, gets Tom a bruise, a loss of 5 but Sarah gains 5. If
he tattles untruthfully, he gets a gain of 5 and Sarah loses 5. If they get along, no one gets anything
If Sarah decides to hit Tom, what would Tom’s best response be
Selected
Answer: b.
Not tell
Answers: a.
Hide
b.
Not tell
c.
Run
d.
Tell
? Question 5
1 out of 1 points
Nash equilibrium is:
Selected
Answer: a.
when each player’s strategy is the best response to the other player’s strategy
Answers: a.
when each player’s strategy is the best response to the other player’s strategy
b.
where the outcome is always efficient
c.
difficult to determine

d.
where one player maximizes his payoff and the other doesn’t
? Question 6
1 out of 1 points
Use the following to answer questions 81-84
Consider the following information for a simultaneous move game: Two discount stores (megastore
and sup