Managerial Economics Week 6 ? Question 1 1 out of 1 points Jim is haggling with a car dealer over the sale price of a used car. When he entered the store, the storekeeper was already haggling with ...

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Managerial Economics Week 6
? Question 1
1 out of 1 points
Jim is haggling with a car dealer over the sale price of a used car. When he entered the store, the
storekeeper was already haggling with the other customer. His bargaining position could get
worse if
Selected
Answer: b.
Another customer enters the store, interested in the
car
Answers:
a.
The customer leaves
b.
Another customer enters the store, interested in the
car
c.
He gets an offer from another seller
d.
All of the above
? Question 2
1 out of 1 points
For the following questions 8-16 use this setup.
Consider a simultaneous move game between a union and a company. If both the parties bargain
hard, each would gain nothing. If only one party bargains hard the accommodating party gets a
profit of $1 million while the bargaining party gets a $5 million, while if they both accommodate,
they each get $3 million.
Is this Nash equilibrium efficient?
Selected
Answer: a.
Yes, because the sum of payoffs is highest
Answers:
a.
Yes, because the sum of payoffs is highest
b.
No, because both the parties can do better
c.
No, because both the parties are maximizing their profits
d.
All of the above
? Question 3
1 out of 1 points
Anna’s Antiques expects to get three bidders for the unique china teacup it sells. Each of the
bidders can either have a high-value of $100 or a low-value of $70 with equal probability. If three
bidders show up at the auction and all of them are high-value bidders, what would the winning
bid be?

Selected
Answer: c.
$100
Answers:
a.
$70
b.
Just above $100
c.
$100
d.
Just above $70
? Question 4
1 out of 1 points
With which choice are you more likely to avoid Bid-rigging cartels?
Selected
Answer: d.
All of the above
Answers:
a.
Winning bids are not identified
b.
Winning bidders are not identified
c.
Cheaters do not fear punishment from other cartel
members
d.
All of the above
? Question 5
1 out of 1 points
A Vickery auction is
Selected
Answer: c.
All of the above
Answers:
a.
Strategically equivalent to an English auction
b.
Does not need to have bidders show up at the same time or place
c.
All of the above
d.
None of the above
? Question 6
0 out of 1 points
Anna’s Antiques expects to get three bidders for the unique china teacup it sells. Each of the
bidders can either have a high-value of $100 or a low-value of $70 with equal probability .If three
bidders show up at the auction, and two of the bidders are high-value, what would the winning
price be?
Selected
Answer: d.

Just above $70
Answers:
a.
$100
b.
Just above $100
c.
$70
d.
Just above $70
? Question 7
0 out of 1 points
Use the following information for questions 36-48
Transcendent Technologies is deciding between developing a complicated thought-activated
software, or a simple voice-activated software. Since the thought-activated software is
complicated, it only has a 30% chance of actually going through to a successful launch